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Relative Clause :itructures and Constraints on ?;:0es 
of Comr,lex Sentences* 
Sandra A. Thorr:p!>on 
'i'he study of relative clause sentences shows rtuite clearly 
the limitations of our :present gras9 of the relation bet...-een 
syntax a:i.d semantics. In tr'.r::..ng to understand what rela.tiYe cl.--.use 
sentences are, I have been struck by t ..·o facts. First, there are 
certain ver/ clear structurRl properties of relative clause 
sentences •,1hic:!1 distinguinh them frorn sentences conta.ininr:. for 
example, sentential subjects or objects. These see~ to me to be 
strictly syntactic properties. Second, there a.re certain ve~r 
subtle meaninr, differences between definite and indefinite noun 
phrases containinF, relative clauses; clearly a seml'l....~tic fact. Let 
us briefly characterize these two facts. 
De$cribing the semantics of definiteness seerns in nart to 
involve, as outlined by· Karttunen (1969), several disju,_~ctive 
statements of ·,;hat the sneaker presupposes the hearer knows about 
the entit:r na.'".led by the definite noun ::ihrase. 3ut this woulci he 
just a bee;inning, for ,re find the definite deter-miner used ,dt~ 
superlativ-es, and ·,re find certain instances of the conditions for 
its use apparently being satisfied, ,ar.d yet it is not U$ed. For 
example, I am puzzled a.s to wh:r we r:;enerall;r say 
(1) Here is a. cookie. 
or 
{2) Have a cookie. 
instead of 
(3) Here is the cookie. 
and 
*'J'his payer and the other pa~er of ~ine annearinr in thiR volu.~e 
constitute the revision cf n:.y P~. ?.L dissertation, recei•ted at 
Ohio State University, December, 19G9. I ar:i indebted to the 
follc:n-:inr- people for valuable dfacu.ssion on variow; a.finects of this 
work: George Bedell, Dale Elliott, Jin Heri. np;er, Shuan-fan f.m1.nr,, 
Andreas Koutsoudas, Gteve Krashen. Star. LeRum, Pete~ 1,lenzel, Barbera 
Partee, Jerry Sande!"s, l'\oi)ert Stocl~well, llc1-iillan Thompson, Arnolil 
Z·n•i cJ::r, and especiall~' to r:y teacher$ Terry Lanr:endoen, Ilse :...ehistc, 
and Charles Fillmore for their inve:;tment of tiM~ ana int.erest in f'.i.Y 
work. Of course, none of these peo?l~ necessarily ar-:rees with 
everything I sa:., here. 
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(4) Have the cookie. 
under conditions that normally ~ive rise to the definite deterniner, 
namely ir. cese the re!~erent is in sight of both speaker and nearer, 
e.s in 
(5) Look at the dog, 
(6) ?lease 	lock the door. 
I look for.,ard to a discussio!l of a model of linp;uistic description 
which allows for an account of s-uch ser.rn::itic areas as def'inite!less; 
I see no proposal of such e model even on the horizon at ~resent. 
The stru~tural facts I have been referring to include t!1e 
follo;dng: Belative clause sentences appear to be instances of the 
syntactic device know'n es embedding. Howe·.rer, when T~e cor..:i;:-a:-e them 
to sentences containing embedded subjects and objects as in 
(7} His s~eakin~ so eloouentlv impresses me. 
{8) I like 	his speaking so eloauently. 
we find that the embedded portions of {7) and (8) play an obli~ator:,, 
role with respect to the main verb, the role which Fillmore (1968) 
has called the o~jective case. In addition, the verb governs bot~ 
the occurrence of the clau~e in such sentences and the t:rpe of 
clause which can occur. These facts are not true of' relative clause 
sentences. The relative clause plays no role, obligatory or other-
·..rise, vi th respect to the main verb. lio verb, then, is ever marked 
for taking a relative clause, Structurally speaking, it is superfluous. 
The relative clause sentence amounts to two independent propositions; · 
These facts 	can be accounted for if only sentences with embedded 
subjects and objects are considered to be instances of underlying 
embedding, and relatbre clause sentences a.re taken as instances of 
underlying conjwiction. 
The facts that lead me to this conclusion seem to be quite 
independent or whether the head noun in the relative clause sente~ce 
is definite or indefinite. T:~ere is no structural motivation for . 
assuming a different underlying representation for these two sentences: 
(9) The pitcher that I gave to Harry last ::e~.r is on 
Jane 1 s table now. 
(10} 	 A pitcher that I gave to Harry last year is on 
Ja.~e 1 s table no~. 
De.finiteness is sinply not relevant for S!)ecif'ying these syntactic 
facts about relative clause sentences. 
The approach which appears to me to be incorrect, that there 
is no underlying autonomous level of syntactic representation, has 
been argued for by Lako:ff' ( to appear) , La}~off and Ross (1967) , 
Mccawley (1967, 1968a, 1968b, in press). I object to this position 
on tvo grounds. 
First, it suggests that there is, if we can just get deep 
enough,~ abstract representation (referred to by the proponents 
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as 11the semantic representation''} for a sentence. Bi..:.t there 
is no reason to believe t:Ziat one deep structure cannot underlie 
more than one sentence, even where the sentences are not necessaril.'/ 
synonymous. 
;.:y second !)oint of criticism fa that it seeru (2Ui.te nossihle, 
and' I t~ir,.k conceptually valuable, to define a level of renresentation 
exhibiting 'the relationships a~ong the ite.::".S in one .:1entence as ,,ell 
es the rela.tionships a..;1,ong the simplex components of a c-or::plex 
structure. The 4uestion or ~hether these relationshi~r, are se~a.ntic 
or syntactic sirtpl:r does not need to arine. '!.'he fact is trH1t these 
rPlations a.monr, the structur~l elements of a sentence can ~e 
represented forr.ia.lly in ter.::s of' ~tructures -:.:hich undeille m.:rface 
structures exactly accoroin~ to the kinds o~ argunents for under-
l:,ing structures •,rhich can be fou...'1d in Postal (1961.) a.nd Chor.'lsk:,r 
(1965). !foreove!", it is ol".lY information of this relational t:rne 
which has been shown so far to ,justi!)' any fornt!.lisr.i for underl;.rinf;!' 
representations. In other 'h"ords, we can conceive of a theor~r of 
sentence structure in ter:r.is of a model in wai-ch superficial syntactic 
structures a.re related to more abstract s:.·ntactico-sunantic structures. 
These are the <l.eepest re:Jresentations t:i:iich •,re are able to discover 
by the use of linguistic evidence; the:t renresent the relationships 
B.lllone; the basic pieces of a sentence. This view will be elaborated 
in more detail below. 
In other words, as lon~ as we insist that sentences {9} and 
(10} must have different deepest ,mcterl:rinl" renresiJnt~tions because 
they have recoi,::niza":)ly different , the structure.1 relation-
sb.ip bet~een relative clause sentences and conjunct.ions will be 
virtually ible to discern, Indeed this relationship hns not 
been observed, and I think this is because it is very di~ficult to 
represent one -pair of conjuncts as distinct fror.1 another in such a· 
va.y as to canture the mea..~ing difference bet~een {9} and {10). I, 
for one, cannot construct such conJunction sets. 
In fa.ct, I think this is totally incorrect. understandins;: 
of the structure of relative clause sentences and sentence co=plexity 
d1::r,ends upon the assumption that the deepest structure of a sentence 
does not exhibit the full range of information about its mee.nine. 
I will suggest that what underlies a sentence is not a single 
• - 1 ' .......h · · ' t t.·h ·t t n b t represer.tat1on reve~1ng everJ~ in~ ~na .a sen ence 11 means, u, 
instead a ic elemental structure" (BES) f'or that sentence 
plus a set of parameters which cEm be associated ,1ith this RES ant 
-which play a :i:-ole in deterninini;i: the transformations which it can 
undergo a.nd what its surface structure will be. The BES will 
s;iecify the meanings of' ncontent ·,1ords" and the relationshins a."'lon~ 
thet'l. 
'l'o see how I slli!gest thet syntactic structu:::-es and. semantic 
''pa.rametersn might interact, let us take e.n example. Und.erl::lnr: 
the sentence 
(11) We found the boo!'.:. that 'Jerry ,.·:rote . 
would be the BtS: 
------ -----
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(12) 	 s 
6 S 
~ 	~ 
ve found book 	 Terry wro~e book 
~he way this structure co~es to the surface ia determined partially 
by sue~ factors as definiteness. If the speaker presup~osesl that 
111Presup;,oses x 11 is here used in the fairly well-accepted ser:se 
of 11believes x, 11 where x represents a set of conditions ·,;hich must 
be met t'or a given sentence to be uttered in good faith) .and .;hich 
are independent of the illocutionar::r force of that sentence. 
the hearer knows neither of the facts expressed in the conjunction, 
the suri'a.ce l~orm of" the sentence mey be the co.njunction 
(13) Terr:,r 1.n-ote a book and 'Je :found it. 
or either of 	the following relative clause sentences, wtth an 
indefinite head noun: 
( J.4) We found 	a book that 'i'err:r ·..'rote. 
(15) Terry wrote a book th~t we found. 
If the .speaker presupposes that the hearer knows about the fo.ct 
expressed in 	the first conjunct, the correspondin~ relative clause 
sentence will 	have that conjunct as the relative clause, and the 
head noun must be definite: 
(16) Terry wrote the book t1:e.t we found. 
and if the speaker presupposes that the hearer knows about the 
information of the second conjm1ct. the surface sentence will be 
{17) ;te found the book that Terry wrote. 
'.i:'he implications of this analysis as vell as irell as the 
relationship between non-restrictive relativ~ clause sentences and 
conjunctions are discussed uore fully in r.i:r paper, "The deep 
structure of relative clauses." 
This account is the only one I Irno•..r o:f which at:.emnts to 
characterize the fact t~at, with the definite deter~iner, the 
relative clause exnresses inf"o!T.'.ation which the stiealrnr presunposes 
to be known by the hearer. 
It might 1Je sur,gested that, instead of h.?.vinr. certain senantic: 
paramete~s affecting the de~ivation of a sentence at various under-
1;,ring levels, I c:ould as easily have sena"'ltic interpretation rule!. 
assign appropriate readinP,G to the surface structure of t:1e sentence 
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in auestion. Althou,T,h there is much that is sir::.iler in these t,m 
posfti0!1S, eiridence $UCh as th~ fellowing, 1;hich 'W"E'\.S T.lro,rided by 
Ste::.,hen r..ra.shen {personal comnunice.tion), forces me to :prefer 
the former. The p:resupposition'1.l £acts which hold for relati,,e 
clause sentences hold for sentences 11ith pre-nominal a.d,jectives 
as ,.tell. The sentence 
(18) Janice vore the outfit that is black. 
is used by a. speaker .rho :p:r1::supnoses that the hearer J~no•.:s about the 
outfit tht1t is blacJ.-:. The sentence 
(19} ,Janice •.tore the bla.d: outfit. 
carries 11recisely the same presuppositions. A som.a.'1tic inter-
nretat~on rule pro1riding this information which operated. on surface 
structures 1tould either ha·re to be stated twice, once for each 
surface structure, or it wou1d have to contain a note to the effect 
that what is seman'tically true of relative clause sentences is true 
of ~renominal adjective sentences. Gince neither of the~e alterna-
tives is defensible, I prefer to •dew the intere.cti~n between s~rnta.x. 
and senantics as I have outlined ~bove. 
In certain respects VQ.' view of the relationshir, ·:)et,1een synta.x 
and sena.ntics is reminhcent of that -nut forth in Ch.apter 9 of 
Chomsky (1957) : • · · 
It seems clear that undeniable, tho-ugh only 
imperf'ect corresJ)Ondences hold bet·,;reen formal and 
semantic fentures in lanu,u.a~e. The fact that the 
correspondences are so inexact suggests tl:iat mea.ninr:; 
will be relatively useless as a basis for grammatical 
description. Careful analysis of each proposal for 
reliance on meaning confirns this and shows, in fact, 
that important ipsights and gene~alizations about 
linguistic structure may be missed if' va.-gue semantic 
clues are followed too closely. For example, ve have seen 
that the active-passive relation is ,just one instance of 
aver~ general and fundamentr.Ll asuect of formal linv,ni$tic 
struc:tur~. The .similarity between active-passive, 
negation, declarative-interrogative, and other trans-
for:rr..ationn.l relations ·would not have come to liirht if' 
the active-pass:i:v-e relation had been investi,:r.a.t~d. exclu-
sively ·in terms of such notions as s:rnonymit~r. {p, 10) 
To digress briefly, m;r position is nlso reniniscent of the nosition 
taken b:, the opponents of .Bert:ra.nd Russell 1 s nTheor:t of Descriptions." 
[According to Russell. (1905 1 1919), definite noun phrases which 
a.re complex "refer to11 entities in a v-eriJ special ~..,a.v. J S11ch noun 
phrases cannot refer to ent:.tties in the ordinary.sense, he argues, 
because it is quite :possible to rcfomulate a pToposition contfl.ininf;'.' 
the noun phrase in question ,ri thput mentioninr. it_ all. ½O, the 
sentence 
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(20) The author of Waverley is Scotch (sic). 
is actually a conjunction of three propositions: 
(21) (a) At least one person wrote T..;'averley. 
(b} At most one person urote ;fave!"ley. 
{c} Whoever 1n-ote Waverley is Scotch. 
Russell {1919, p. 177) 
A sentence like (20), then, does not have to be viewed n.s r.teaninl'l:less 
ev·en if there is no author of l·hl.'ler~; (20} could be asserted to ':le 
f'alse bees.use {21a) '.Ta:, false. Sinilarl:r, the sentence 
(22) The King of France is bald. 
can be shown to be false because one of its underlyinF, propositions 
is f'alse. 
This view was criticized, I think correctly, b:r both Geach and 
Strawson. According to Geach (1950), wnen the definite noun phrase, 
"the king of France" is the logical sub,ject of a. sentence, an 
affirmative answer is presupposed to the Question 
( 23) Does the King of France e:d st 1 
Since the answer to (23} is ne6ative, the use of the phrase as a 
logical subject is out of place, and the g_uestion of the truth of a 
sentence in which the phrase is a logical subject does not ari~e. 
Strawson {1950) objects in e. similar vein: it is false to 
say that a sentence such as (20) contains the proposition {21a) ;ri-t:1out 
recognizing that (20} is an assertion and (21a) is nimplied11 (iP-
some sense of that term) by (20). 
Hou."l :phrases containine relative clauses a.re ,,definite descri.n-
tions 11 for Russell, similar to the subjects of ( 20) and (22). :·?hile 
the philosopaical problem to -1hich Russell, Geach, and Strawson 
,,,,ere addressing thenselves is not of central concern here, the 
conclusion of the latter t~..,o thinkers parallels that which I he.ve 
reached. In fact, I a.rn. going one step further: in addition to 
claiming that the user of the phrase 
(24) the girl who speaks Basque 
presup9oses the existence of such a girl, I am suggestinP. that.he also 
presupposes that her existence is known to the hea=er. 
A. "Stacked" Relative Clauses. 
:fost accounts of relative clause structures that I know of 
simply assume an underlyin~ embedded structure, a natural assumption 
to make on the basis of their surface e~bedded form. The notable 
exception is the ',/'Ork of the UCIA :Cnr:lish Syntax Pro,1ect (Stockwell 
et al. {1968)}, in which an attempt is made to j_ustify the unde:'.·l.v:.~g 
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embedded stt:-ucture. It is arp;ued there that the correct anal:v"sis 
of relative clauses requi~es configurations of the form 
(25) 
Stocbrell et ,,,al, (1968}, 11Relativization11 
The argument for trris representation turns on the cla.il'l tho.t IiP' s 
contalnine more than one relative clause can be interoreted in sucri 
a. wa.:, t1ll'tt each successiYe relati•1e clause from l'ittht to left 
"modifies" or ''restricts" the meaning of the head ;oun :nlus the 
preceding relati7e clauses. Let us take an example (op. cit. p. 23): 
(26) 	 The colt the.t our stallion sired that r;rew uo 
in Indiana. won the Derby. 
One interpretation for { ) is 
(27) 	 Out of all the colts sired by our stallion, 
the one that m:m the Derby grev up in 
Indiana. 
rn this interpretation t the cla.use that grew !a,D in Indi::i.na is taken 
as "restricting't the class of ob,1ects referred to by the exrression 
the ~olt that our stallior, sired, Let us call an interpretation 
like that represented by ( 27) a 11stacked interpretation'' of Fl. 
multiple-relation-clause sentence, and let us furthermore call the 
clause that "modifies" the head noun and the other relative clause 
in suoh a.n interpretation the "higher ranking cle:uee. 0 The structure 
for (26) according to the UCLA analysis would be: 
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(28) 
D 
I 
the 
colt 
the :r 
:.ip IVP colt 
~m,r ~ sired the colt 
J I 
our 'N  
j  
stallion 
Ir the stacked internretation of (26) has as its basis a structure 
like (28), then we h~ve both an argument for a.n embeddinF analysis 
of relative clause s.entences and an argw:!ent ar;ainst a conjoininp; 
analysis of such sentences, sinQe a conjoining structure could not 
directly sho·..r that tb.e clause which I have labeled 81 in structure 
(28} is of higher rank than that ~hich I have labeled S2 • 
However, as was pointed out to me by C. J. Filll:iore, although 
multi:ple relative clause constructions can be interpreted this wa:y, 
there a.re good reasons for rejecting the 9roposal that :=;tacked 
interpretations should be explained in terms o.f' stacked structures. 
First, notice that the stacked interpretation is closely 
correlated with stress, For many spea~ers, a non-conjoined inter-
pretation is possible onlY._ if one clause or the other is stressed, 
otherwise, the subject of {26) would be interpreted, for these 
speakers, as referring to a. colt that both had our stallion as· 
a pa.rent and grew up in Indiana. For a few speakers, the stacked 
interpretation is possible vitn no special stress; for them a 
normally stressed multiple relative clause sentence is ambiguous 
between (a) a conjoined interpretation and (b) a stacked interDre-
ta.tion in which the outer relative clause is of higher rank. 
Incidentally, as pointed out in Stockwell et al (1968), the colt 
specified by interpretation {a) is the sane colt as the one specified 
by intervertation (b). In other words, a conjoined and stacked 
interpretation do not differ extensionnlly; 
The crucial point here is that for both of these grou~s of 
s:oeakers, the interpretation can be switched so that the inner 
clause is interpreted as being of higher rank simµly b~f stressinn: 
--------------
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that inner 	clause. 2 So, 
62-,h i·c· , 1 · • • t th , · i ··.i. ,e u !Jr. group 1as recov,n1zeu "r.a , e ste.c,:ea. nterpreta.t1on 
of relative clauses is problematic, but their conclusion is that 
ucce"f)tin;:: o::- not acce:;;tinr;: a stacked internretation is one respect 
in ;rnich dialects can var:r, and that to describe this difference 
rni.,,;ht involve nostulatinr different ( thougn ·:.0th e::::iedded) anal:rses 
of relative clause sentences. 
(29) 	 The colt t:iat our stallion sired t:1at .Et:t"e'.t un 
in Irrdiana ;-ron the Derby. 
cannot be interpreted by either gro~~ of speakers exccnt in the 
follo:ring way: 
(30) Out of all the co
one that ·.;as 
Derb~r. 
lts that ;i;re'.·, up 
sired b:r our sta
in Indiana, 
llion won the 
t:1.e 
'/.hat this means is t:1at there is no ~otivation at all for tr~.cinr: to 
explain stacked interrretations on the ba.ais o:: underl;vinr:- e:nbeddinJT 
relationships in terr.:r. of ;.rhich the outer relative clause is "higher" 
than the head noun with the inner relative dause. The fact the.t 
a clause is 11higher11 in a structure like (29} does not SP.em to 
correlate wit:i. w:iether it. is interpreted. as beinR; of hig:her rnnk. 
It rnig11t be argued that some device could easily be introduced into 
the strueture which :-rould allov the lo•,;er relative clause to be 
interpreted as the higher :t"artkine; one, or that a 1'clause-scrar.tl.ilinr 
rule fl could operate. Eoirever, neither of these de,,~ices would in an:,' 
way enhance the pro_postl t:i.a.t a stacked interpretation is based on 
a stacked structure, since the r;,urno,;e of the introduction of either 
of these devices would be to force a certain interpretation in 
~~2£ the structure. In other words, the internretaticn is 
independent of the structure, and the theory should reflect thut 
t~is is the case. 
Gecond, if a stacked relative clause structure could be 
.justified, anri: did influence interpretation; then we ~,roulrl e;,mect 
to find that prer,osed adjectives ·,muld carry •,rit-., them the infornation 
as to whic:1 clause, in terms of position, the:r car.:e fror... 'l'he 
fact that the~r do not makes the stacked structure highl;r sus;?icious. 
That is, we can interpret the adJective-prepc,sing ru.le as O}')eratinF: 
cyclicall:,•, and ..rorkint::: fron the bottcri up, on each cycle insertina: 
the adjective into the l!P of the 8 immediatel:r above it. Trut 
notice that no matter whether each ri.<ljective iG ;)laced bef'or_i: the 
adjective from the next lower 8, or after it, there is still no 
correlation bet,.;een this linear orderi::ir.: and inter-:-1retation of rank. 
For example, rror.i the noun nhrairn 
( 31) the man 1-r:10 has a bea:-d ~ho is be.re-footed 
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we can derive the followine; noun phrases, by ;'}re1Josinp: one 
adjective at a time; 
(32) the bearded IMn who is bare-footed 
( 33) the be.re-footed. r.ian who has ,a. uea.rd 
or both together; 
(34) ihe bearded bare-footed ~an 
In each case, the intcrpreta~icn is linked to the stress: the 
adJecth•e ·1,,hat is stressed is internreted as ?nodif;rini_:; tl1e rest 
of the :-1P, inde!)ender::t of its nosi tion; if neither is stressed, 
they a.re inter-preted as being con,j oined. 
?hird, if the stacked relative clause stru~ture ~ere a basic. 
meanine;-deternining structure, we would exnect the interpretation 
to come as natµrally for sentences with indefinite determiners as 
for those vith definite determiners. Actually this is not the case; 
a stacked i::iterpretie.tion is Ye-::y dif'f'icult to in-pose on an HP wit~ 
an indef'inite determiner: 
( 35) A man who had a beard who was 1-rearini; a striped 
shirt was passinr; out McCarthy button:,. 
If •,;e assumed that a stacked interpretation of relative clauses is 
structurally based, then, ~iven that such an interpretation cannot 
be imposed on an indefinite sentence, we would have to find a W'R.Y 
of blocking such structures in case the definite deter.niner has not 
been chosen; or alternatiYely, we would have to block the choice 
o:f the indefinite determiner for this structure. Either of' these 
vould seer:i to be an unfortunate de\rice to introduce, since I know 
o:f no other cases in which the c:1.oice of the definite determiner 
depends solely on the structure of the sentence into which it is to 
be inserted. 
What I have shown here indicates ti1at a.n argunent for a.."'1. 
enbedded analysis of relative clauses which depends on a structill"nl 
explanation for the stacked interpretation of relative clauses 
collapses ..rhen this ex-planation is shown to be the wronp; one for 
such an interpretation. 
B. 1-!oun Complements . 
Relative clauses have been noted to be distinct from er-ibedded 
clauses in seYeral important respects. Another t::--re of ap~arently 
enbedded clause which can be sho·.-rn to beh,we structu.r;'.?..llY 1-;iui te 
si.."'llilarl:',t to relative clauses 1.s the noun coreple;::;.ent !!.5 in 
(36) 	 The idea t~at he will Yote for the bill worries 
us. 
as ·,rith relative clause sentences, (36} rna.\es two independent 
prepositions involving the noun idea: t}1e that clause is str-ucturall:r 
superfluous, If we po~tulate (37) ns,n source for {36) 
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C. ,.,132 
(37) 
'-'l 
~~ ~ 
idea wo:r::ries me idea. is S 
6 
he will vote 
f'or the bill 
we find that ::,recisely the sar:ie rules that generate relative ~lause 
sentences fro.tn conjunctions are used in the derivation of noun-
complement 	sentences as ~ell. From (37), by embedding 82 into S1, 
we can derive 
(33) 	 The idea which is that he will vote for the 
bill worries us 
Deletion of the ~nI-form ~lus BE is obligatory vhen the BE is 
follow~n by a cample~entizer and a sentence, resulting in sentence 
(36). C:.~bedding s1 into s2 results in 
(39) 	 The idea vhich worries us is that he uill Yote 
for the bill. 
The di~ference between the two nhrasea 
{40) the idea. that we should go to the party 
(41) the idea that you mentioned 
is clearly that, in the first the that is a comulementizer ~hile in 
the second it is a relative word, a replacive for another occurrence 
of idea. This correlates with the fact that they do not con,1oin: 
(42) 	*the idea tha.t we should go to the party and 
that. you mentioned 
Thus , although both ( 40} and ( 41) c e.n be deri 11ed f:rom con,1unction$ 
( though not the same conjunctions) 1,y the same set of rules~ they 
a.re not structurally identical. Tl1e structural difference also 
correlates ',,it:'l the fact that relative clause noun phrases~ like 
( 4 3} the dof!: t:iat the:r bou~ht 
and noun-co~plement phrases as 
(4h} the idea. that she's a mother 
normally receive different intonation patterns. 
----------
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One might obje~t that in rrr:r analysis the }Jl;'l.:rallelisn 
between the clair.i that 8 and I claim that S is lost. It seer:is 
quite reasonable, however, to consider that the lexicon shovs that 
such noun-verb pairs a.re listed w'i th the inforriation thut where 
the verb tekes a sentential object, the noun takes e. sentential 
predicate nominal. 
Placing the remarks we have just made concerninr, the nature 
of relative clause e.nd noun complement sentences i~ a broader 
perspective of sentence complexity, let us consider the variety 
o:t' sentence types for which embedding a.nal:,ses have been proposed. 
The embedded Sin ea.ch case has been circled. 
{45) That the doctor came at all surnrised me. 
------------s---------~ ~ ~p 
~ I 
D '~ ~~ ~;:rpti~'''. 1 - V 
+PRO I 
..J 
That the doctor 
ca.me at all sur
I 
prised 
I 
I; 
I 
I 
Rosenbau.~ (1967), p. 12 
(46) They doubt that you will go. 
s 
NP l'DP · 
l ~
they V VP IrP 
I ~ 
doubt D '.'I @
I 
[ +n J -~ +PRO you will p.;o 
Rosenbaum {1967}, p, 34 
{47) Bill 'condescended to st9,1, here. 
-------- -----
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-------s-----ZIP 	 PDP I 	 I 
Bill -----VP------ .,j 	 ® 
I . _,.,,-..... 
condescend ~ ~ 
Billsta,yhere 
P.osenbam1 (1967), p. 9h 
(48) Somebody trusts 	John to do the wo:rk. 
s 
NP 	 PDP 
[ 	 l 
Somebody 	 VP -------r-----
v NP ® 
I l/~trust John 	 L:.__~ 
John do the vork 
Rosenbau.~ (1967), p, 9 
(49) John is m.o:re clever than Bill. 
~s----_ 
llP 	 PP 
I 	 ~ 
John Aux VP 
/~
is Pred 
 
Comper Ad.j
___-:7--...___ I 
more than clever(9 
~ 
Bill is clever 
Chomsk:t (1965), p. 178 
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(50) the ooy I saw 
HP 
HP 
the ~-"'boy 
Ross {1967), ·, 184 
(51) the professor I liked 
Stockwell et 	al. (19G8}, nRelath·izP.tion,1' p. 3 
(52) 	 UP 
Det·-------------~ 
H 	 © 
Dean (1967). 	p. 34 
Tl1e previous three structures for relative clause sentences ere in 
competition. 
(53) I regret that it is raininc. 
s 
VP 
I ~ 
:;r------~ 
I V RP 
1-----· 
regret :"act U 
~ 
it is rair.in.a: 
After Kipe.:rsk:r ( forti1cor:iine) 
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The f'ollmrinp: set of confir,ura.tions sUM.,ne.rizes the env:ironr.ents 
in which it ha:a been proposed that ::.'s be introduced: 
{5li} (a) HP {o} VP (c) car.roar 
~ ~ ~
{D} 	 Ii ® V WP) @) more than @
I 
it 
( d.) HP (e} IIF' 
~- ~
Det N!1P © ~
ti.ET © 
(g) ['iP 
. /---
f'act @ 
The fact that e2ci1 of the structures in {5h) has been recentl~r 
cnlled into question sup:gests to n,e that a Yery na:tural constraint c.an 
te placed on the introduction of er:1heci.ded f; 1 s . The adYa.ntar;es of 
eliminatirn.'.' both ,:=;tructures (a.) and (b) ha.Ye been fully dec.lt with h:,,-
UCLA (1969), 11Ifominaliz~tfon, it Bowers (1968), and Wa.e;ner {1966), a more 
ad~~uate analysis than (c) for the conparative is provided ~Y Celce 
( 1970) ~ and I have shmm here why structures {d} thrau,qh ( g} f'e.:il tc b~ 
the best. re:;ire:.entations for relative clauses e.nd noun corinler.1ents. T:'1.e 
only instances of er.1lledded S ·,,hich rer.iain unquestioned a.re those in 
which the S is the unio_ue ex:na.nsion of an HP which is a sub.Ject or an 
object • Extending Fillr.tore' s sup;ge :;ition (1968) , :o. 2.!1 to 11lir.iit 
compler.:ent S to the cM e OBJECTIVE, 11 I would swm:est that 
(55) 	 All occurrences of non-tor.·rr.oat S's not immeaiately 
dominated by S be li~ited to unique exnansion5 
of subject or object NP's. 
Let us call ( 55) the 11 embeddimr constraint. 11 Such a constraint 
limits the power of a eramma:r in an ir.:Portant way by providing a natura.1 
reE:tl'iction on the 1.rays in "-'hich comrle:r. sentences rna,y be built out 
o:f simple ones 1 and it pro·1i.des an account of' the differences bet\:cen 
et:ibedded and con.joined structures which I have pointed out above. 
APPmmrx 
Some further rcnarks are in order concernin~ one member of the cla~~ 
of nouns which take the surface com:pler.1ents, namely 1~1· I seem to 
be 5Ugp:esting that sentences such Rs: 
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{56) I regret the fact that Jack is 
(57) I re~ret that Jack is ill. 
have different BES's, that {56) would be derived from a conjunction, 
while (57) vould result from embedding Jack is ill_ as the object of 
regret. !n fact, I think that the distinction made by the Kiparskys, 
(forthcoming) bet',reen factive a.nd non-fa.ctive complements is a very 
important one and I agree with them that sentences like (56} have 
the same source as sentences like ( 57). I would propose the following 
source: 
(58) 
~ 
I regret fact 
.;:.;..;;.;.a.;;;..;:;..;..is a verb which must take fact a.s its ob}ect; application of 
which deletes yield~ 
(59) I regret {Jack is ill), 
which more directly underlies (57}. 
As confirmation or {58), Stephen Krasnen has ~ointed out to me 
that if a configuration must be involved in stating the presupposition 
of factivity, a.s Kipa.rskys claim, it cannot be: 
(60) !-fP 
/~
fact S 
The reason for this is that the truth of the sentence 
is presu~posed in: 
(61) The fact that I regret is that Jack is ill. 
exactly e.s it is in (56) • According to my analysis, both {56) and 
' 	(61) a:r,e derived from the s a.me BES, namely ( 58) ( s.ee p. 31 ) , so that 
this semantic fact is accounted for in a natural wa:y. But the 
Kiparskys would h&:ve to have some way besides ( 60) to account :for 
the presupposition o:f' facti,rity in (61), since there is no (60) 
under the VP node in the underlyin~ representation that they would 
suggest :it has: 
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(62} -------s-----!fP 	 VP 
~ 	 /------fact 8 	 S ~--~ 	 ~ 
I regret fa.ct 	 Jack. is ill 
In ter:ms of this analysis of factive sentences we are now ready 
to consider- an e.!)_narent counterexaJ!l,ple to the el".!bed.dinr- constr-aint. 
A sentence lik~ 
f~~;~ates \ 
(63} That the floor is sticky ir.t.plies r that{ oroves t• I _,. 
Darlene s~ille~ the Koolaid. 
seems to contain tvo occurrences of the OI3.TECTIVE ca.se, a. natural 
concl.u.sicn if cor.tplex subjects a.nd objects can arise only from ;r:r's 
in a.."l O.BJECTIVB relationship to the verb. As D. T. Lo.ni,;cndoen pointed 
out to nei however~ two facts indicate that the objections raised by 
this type of sentence are onl.Y pseudo-probler,,.s for the er,.beddinf 
constraint: (a) the subJect clause in ( 63) is a predicate nominal 
clause to fact; and (b) this noun fa.ct is in the !!TSTR!Jl'EY!TAL case. 
To demonstrate point (a.), I would cite the obvious nl'!-ra.phrase of 
(63), . 
shows ·1 
in_dicates t 
(64) 	 The .f.act that the floor is stick:,r / \ i::ir,ilies I 
l,_proves j 
that Darlene snilled the Koolaid. 
Furthermore 
shows "\ 
indicates ·; 
(65) *(The f"a.ct) that the floor is stick:,· irr,plie!; ;,
( :oroYe:::i 
-. ,I 
the fact that Darlene spille-d the Koolaid. 
with the fact in both clauses, is un~rar.tinatical., becauGc of a 
selectionalrestriction ui:lich does not allow sho;;, in~t~. iJ:",Pl][_. 
:E!..C?Y.£, and the like to occur with factive ob,1ects. Sentence T!Sh) no,r 
can be shm.rn to 1,e identical, in structure to a sente·nce like (66) 
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(66) The knife out the cheese, 
~'ha.t is. a knife can i;:ut cheese only if someone uses it to cut 
cheese; a. fact does not prove so::iething unless someone uses it to 
prove something. In each case the ,,er'o requires an aff,ent, which 
may be optionally deleted, The fas_l-clause in {64) is thua an 
underlyinti: inst:rmnental il? i ,}ust ao the knife is in ( 66) • ':'he 
BBS I nronose for (64) is: ----
~~ 
fa.ct proves f.l fact iD 8 
~  
Darlene sTiilled Koolaid floor is sticky 
( 67) 
C'~------ s 
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